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Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) provides a strong second
factor for user authentication. In TOTP, a prover authenticates to a
verifier by using the current time and a secret key to generate an
authentication token (or password) which is valid for a short time
period. Our goal is to extend TOTP to the group setting, and to
provide both authentication and privacy. To this end, we introduce
a new authentication scheme, called Group TOTP (GTOTP), that
allows the prover to prove that it is a member of an authenticated
group without revealing its identity. We propose a novel construc-
tion that transforms any asymmetric TOTP scheme into a GTOTP
scheme. Our approach combines Merkle tree and Bloom filter to
reduce the verifier’s states to constant sizes.
As a promising application of GTOTP, we show that GTOTP
can be used to construct an efficient privacy-preserving Proof of
Location (PoL) scheme.We utilize a commitment protocol, a privacy-
preserving location proximity scheme, and our GTOTP scheme to
build the PoL scheme, in which GTOTP is used not only for user
authentication but also as a tool to glue up other building blocks.
In the PoL scheme, with the help of some witnesses, a user can
prove its location to a verifier, while ensuring the identity and
location privacy of both the prover and witnesses. Our PoL scheme
outperforms the alternatives based on group digital signatures. We
evaluate our schemes on Raspberry Pi hardware, and demonstrate
that they achieve practical performance. In particular, the password
generation and verification time are in the order of microseconds
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and milliseconds, respectively, while the computation time of proof
generation is less than 1 second.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) is widely used in many
two-factor authentication systems, for example, Google Authen-
ticator [17] and Duo [10]. TOTP allows a prover to generate a
time-dependent password that remains valid for a pre-defined time
duration. A verifier checks the authenticity of the password by
using the current time and some other information. There are two
types of TOTP: symmetric one based on a shared secret key be-
tween the prover and verifier [34], and asymmetric one that can be
verified publicly [32]. The first type uses the shared secret key and
message authentication code to prove the authenticity of a gener-
ated password. The second type relies on hash chains, and it is one
important building block of this work. An asymmetric TOTP prover
randomly generates a hash chain head (pw0) and keeps hashing the
value to construct a hash chain. Namely, given a hash function H,
the i-th node pwi is computed as pwi := H(pwi−1). The last node
(tail) of the chain will be shared with verifiers for verification. To
authenticate itself, the prover sends the verifier the chain’s nodes
in reverse order from tail to head. The verifier can quickly verify
every received node but cannot forge an unseen node due to the
one-wayness of the underlying hash function. Furthermore, any
attackers who compromise the public key of an asymmetric TOTP
cannot infer any unused passwords (unlike the first type).
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TOTP is designed for the prover to prove its identity to the ver-
ifier. As such, it does not provide privacy, i.e., the verifier has to
know the identity of the prover beforehand, in order to check the
validity of every TOTP. In this paper, our goal is to extend TOTP to
the group setting in order to achieve a meaningful notion of privacy.
To this end, we propose Group Time-based One-Time Password
(GTOTP) scheme, in which a prover belonging to a group can gener-
ate one-time passwords to convince a verifier of its membership to
the group without revealing its identity. GTOTP is useful in appli-
cations that need group-based, privacy-preserving authentication.
One example is a service provider offering service (e.g., printing,
consulting) only to the people within one community while the
service user wants to preserve its privacy [5]. Another example is
to combine GTOTP with any unilateral (server-only) authenticated
handshake protocol [9, 33] (supported by transport layer security
protocol (TLS) [7, 41]) following the password-based mutual au-
thentication approach (over TLS) [13] to build privacy-preserving
secure channels.
The main challenge in realizing GTOTP is efficiency. One way
to construct GTOTP is to use group digital signatures (GDS) [5, 30].
In particular, the group members share a group public key дpk for
signature verification, while eachmember has its own secret signing
key corresponding toдpk . During authentication, the member signs
the current time-stamp, and the resulting signature is the one-time
password for a fixed duration. However, this approach is expensive
because it involves many public-key operations, which renders it
impractical for resource-constrained devices.
We address this challenge with an efficient construction based on
hash functions. Our key insight is to let each group member initial-
ize multiple hash chain-based TOTP instances, with each instance
used for only a short duration (like in a pseudonym scheme [27]).
Because each TOTP instance yields a verify point (e.g., a tail node
of the hash chain as in TOTP schemes [32] with public verifiability)
for password verification, the result is a large number of states that
the verifier must manage. In particular, the verifier needs to keep
track of all verify points for all members, which does not scale to
large group sizes or long validity duration for each TOTP instance.
Our solution is to compress these states to a constant-sized group
verification state (GVST). More specifically, we use a combination
of Merkle and Bloom filter to store the states.
We then describe an application of GTOTP in building an effi-
cient, privacy-preserving Proof of Location (PoL) scheme. A prover
generates tamper-proof location proofs, with the help of some
nearby witnesses, that convince a verifier that it was at the specific
location at a given time. PoL has many real-world applications, such
as tracking goods moving in supply chains, pandemic contact trac-
ing, and monitoring home arrest. Our PoL construction combines
GTOTP, a commitment scheme, and a privacy-preserving location
proximity (PPLP) scheme. A prover first broadcasts the GTOTP
passwords and a PPLP request generated based on its location to
nearby parties. If a close-by party wants to be a witness, it replies
with its own GTOTP passwords and a commitment of the PPLP
response showing the close proximity. Since the location proof is
not required to be verified immediately, we use the secret seeds of
the corresponding GTOTP passwords as the keys for generating
commitments. Namely, we leverage GTOTP as a tool to glue up
other building blocks in our PoL scheme. During verification, the
prover and the corresponding witnesses, who contributed to the
proof, can open their secret seeds for commitment verification after
the passwords become expired.
Contributions.We make the following contributions:
• We define group time-based one-time passwords (GTOTP), an ex-
tension of the traditional TOTP to the group setting. GTOTP
provides membership authentication and privacy. Our secu-
rity model adopts the game-based approach [2] to formulate
anonymity and traceability (covering password unforgeability)
based on a group with fixed members.
• We design an efficient and generic GTOTP construction that
transforms an asymmetric TOTP scheme into a GTOTP. Our
construction achieves constant memory cost at the verifier.
• To show the application of GTOTP, we construct an efficient,
privacy-preserving PoL scheme using GTOTP. We formally de-
fine a security model for PoL that can be used to analyze the
security properties of a PoL construction.
• We evaluate the performance of GTOTP and the PoL scheme
on a Raspberry Pi. The results show that the cost (latency) of
password generation is 4.12 microseconds on average, and of
password verification is on the order of milliseconds. The proof
generation time for the PoL scheme is less than 1 second when
the number of witnesses is smaller than 10. In summary, both
GTOTP and PoL schemes are practical.
Organization. Section 2 reviews the related works. Section 3 de-
scribes necessary preliminaries. Section 4 introduces the security
model and construction of GTOTP. Section 5 presents the PoL con-
struction. The evaluation results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
Time-based One-Time Password. A TOTP scheme can be con-
structed from a shared secret between the prover and verifier. The
first asymmetric TOTP scheme, one that does not require a shared
secret, is proposed by Lamport [34] based on one-way functions.
In the Lamport scheme, the one-time passwords are organized in a
chain in which the i-th password is generated by applying a one-
way function to the (i-1)-th password. Jin et al. [28] provide the
formal proof for the Lamport scheme in the standard model, and
use TOTP to build a new primitive called proof of aliveness. Ko-
gen et al. [32] proposed T/Key scheme that extends the Lamport
and S/Key scheme [21] by integrating time constraints to the pass-
words. These TOTP schemes are designed for authenticating one
single prover to the verifier, and therefore do not have the privacy
property of our group based scheme.
Proof of Location. Waters and Felten [49] proposed the first proof
of location scheme in a centralized setting, in which a location
manager is trusted to sign the proof based on measurement of the
round-trip communication with the prover. The provider identity
is encrypted with the verifier’s public key, therefore is hidden from
the location manager. Graham and Gray [18] proposed a scheme
called SLVPGP that removes the need for the location manager.
The proof in SLVPGP is based on distance related to a number of
devices specified by the verifier. The scheme uses public keys of
the prover, therefore it does not provide privacy.
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In the decentralized settings, Zhu and Cao [52] proposed AP-
PLAUS, in which either provers or users periodically change their
pseudonyms and exchange signed messages and location proofs
with each other. However, location privacy in this scheme depends
on user behaviors. In other words, it assumes a user-centric loca-
tion privacy model and may suffer non-negligible location privacy
loss. King [31] proposes FOAM that relies on decentralized and
trusted zone anchor beacons with synchronized clocks. The beacons
determine the location of a user via triangulation, and store the
signed location on a blockchain as the proof. The scheme, however,
does not address privacy of the users. Wu et al. [50] proposed a
blockchain-based zero-knowledge proof of location scheme. The
user obtains a location certificate from a number of location bea-
cons, as in FOAM, and generates a zero-knowledge proof of its
with the help of the beacons. Dupin et al. [11] proposed another
privacy-preserving scheme using group signatures for identity pri-
vacy, combining with secure multi-party computation for location
privacy. It achieves strong privacy guarantees, but suffers high per-
formance overhead due to the expensive cryptographic primitives.
The existing decentralized proof of location schemes use dig-
ital signatures, which may render them impractical for running
frequently on low-power devices. Furthermore, they lack formal
security analysis. Our PoL based on GTOTP is efficient because
it does not use digital signatures, and it is provably secure. We
compare our scheme against other state-of-the-arts in Section 6.3.
3 PRELIMINARIES
We denote the security parameter by κ, an empty string by ∅, and
the set of integers between 1 and n by [n] = {1, . . . ,n} ⊂ N. We
denote with x $← X the operation of sampling x uniformly at
random fromX . IfX is a probabilistic algorithm, x $← X means that
x is the output of running X with fresh random coins. Let ∥ be the
string concatenation operation. We represent a location LA of a user
A as the two-dimensional coordinates (xA,yB ). Other notations can
be found in Appendix A. In the following, we describe the syntax
of the main cryptographic primitives used in our constructions.
Time-based One-time Passwords. An asymmetric TOTP
scheme consists of 4 algorithms (Setup,PInit,PGen,Verify).
Setup(1κ ,Ts ,Te ,∆s ) takes as input the security parameter 1κ , the
start and end timesTs andTe , and the password generation interval
∆s , and outputs the password number pms = N = (Te − Ts )/∆s .
PInit(sd) takes as input a secret seed sd ∈ KTOTP, and outputs
the initial verify point vp, where KTOTP is the key space for the
input secret seed. PGen(sd,T ) takes as input the secret seed sd and
a time slot T , and outputs a one-time password pw ∈ PWTOTP
forT , where PWTOTP is a password space. Verify(vp,pw,T ) takes
as input the verify-point vp, a password pw , and time slot T , and
outputs 1 if the password is accepted and 0 otherwise.1 For a secure
TOTP scheme, the adversary cannot forge a valid password for a
future time.
1 Note that we define a stateless verification other than the stateful one in prior
work [32], but the security of stateful TOTP (with a stateful verification algorithm)
implies the security of stateless TOTP in our definition. All passwords in a stateful
TOTP can be verified by the initial verification state (IVS). This fact still holds even if
the verification state is updated later.
Bloom Filter. A Bloom filter BF is a probabilistic data structure
that allows efficient membership testing without false negatives.
BF consists of three algorithms (Init, Insert,Check). Init(ϵ,N ) takes
as input ϵ representing the rate of false positive, and the number
of elements N , and initializes a BF which is a bit array of length
1.44ϵ ·N . Insert(m) inserts the elementm into BF.Check(m) returns
1 if an elementm is in the BF, and returns 0 otherwise.
Privacy-preserving Location Proximity Schemes.A PPLP pro-
tocol runs between a checker P and a responder W to determine if
the two entities are in close proximity. It consists of five algorithms
(Setup,KGen, LPInit, LPResp, LPCheck). Setup(1κ ) takes as input
the security parameter 1κ , and outputs the system parameters pms
which contains a threshold θ . KGen(rk) takes as input a secret
seed rk ∈ KPPLP, and outputs a key pair for the checker P, where
KPPLP is the range of the secret seed. LPInit(pk, LP ,θ ) takes as in-
put the public key pk, a location LP = (xP ,yP ) of a checker P and
a distance threshold θ for proximity test, and outputs a proximity
challenge CP . LPResp(pk,CP , LW ) takes as input the public key pk
and a challenge CP from a checker P, and the location of the re-
sponder W. It outputs a proximity responseCW . LPCheck(sk,CW )
takes as input the secret key of a checker P and the response CW ,
and outputs 1 if the checker and the responder are in close proxim-
ity, and 0 otherwise. Here we require a PPLP scheme to be secure
against semi-honest adversaries who are interested in the locations
of uncorrupted participants.
Authenticated Symmetric Encryption. Let KASE be the key
space,MASE be themessage space, and CASE be the ciphertext space.
An authenticated symmetric encryption scheme ASE consists of
three algorithms (Setup, Enc,Dec). Setup(1κ ) takes as input 1κ , and
outputs the parameter pms and a random key k $← KASE. Enc(k,m)
takes as input an encryption key k , and a messagem ∈ MASE, and
outputs a ciphertext C ∈ CASE. We say an ASE is randomized if
Enc is a randomized algorithm. Dec(k,C) takes as input an encryp-
tion key k , and a ciphertext C ∈ CASE, and outputs a message
m ∈ MASE. We require that the ASE scheme can resist adaptive
chosen ciphertext attacks.
Collision-resistant Hash Functions. Let KCRHF be the key
space,MCRHF be the message space, and YCRHF be the hash value
space. A collision-resistant hash function CRHF consists of two
algorithms (Setup, Eval). Setup(1κ ) takes as input 1κ , initializes
the CRHF, and outputs the parameter pms and a random key
hk
$← KCRHF. Eval(hk,m) takes as input a random key hk and
a messagem ∈ MCRHF, and outputs a hash value y ∈ YCRHF. For
a specific collision-resistant hash function H, we write H(m) to rep-
resent H.Eval(hkCRHF,m) when hkCRHF is clear from the context.
Merkle Tree. A Merkle tree [36] allows efficient and secure
verification of a large data set. Let H1 be a collision resistant
hash function. The Merkle tree consists of three algorithms
(MT.Build,MT.GetProof,MT.Verify). MT.Build({Lfi }i ∈[ℓ]) takes
as input ℓ data items and build a Merkle tree MTr on top of them.
The leaf nodes are the data items, and the value of a non-leaf node
is H1(node.LeftChild| |node.RightChild)). MT.GetProof(MTr, Lfi )
takes as input a Merkle tree MTr and a leaf Lfi , and outputs a
proof showing that Lfi is included in the tree. Specifically, the proof
includes the siblings of every node on the path from Lfi to the
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tree’s root MTr.Rt.MT.Verify(MTr.Rt, Lfi , PfLfi ) takes as input the
root MTr.Rt, a leaf node Lfi , and the corresponding proof PfLfi . It
computes a root Rt’ based on Lfi and proof PfLfi , and returns 1 if
Rt’ = MTr.Rt and 0 otherwise. For a secure Merkle tree scheme, the
adversary must not forge the Merkle proof for a leaf node which
does not belong to the Merkle tree.
4 GROUP TIME-BASED ONE-TIME
PASSWORDS
In this section, we present a new primitive, called Group Time-
based One-time Password (GTOTP), which extends asymmetric
TOTP to the group setting. With GTOTP, the prover belonging to a
group can convince the verifier of its group membership without
revealing its identity. A GTOTP scheme has three main properties.
First, only members of the group can generate valid time-based
one-time passwords for authentication. Second, any party that has
the password can verify whether it is a valid password generated
by a member of the corresponding group, without learning the
identity of the password owner. Finally, the group manager can
recover the identity of a password owner if necessary.
Applications that benefit from GTOP are ones that need group-
based, privacy-preserving authentication. In particular, GTOTP
can be used in some applications that otherwise depend on group
signatures. As an example, GTOTP can enable privacy-preserving
secure channels, by combining with any unilateral (server-only)
authenticated handshake protocol [9, 33] (supported by transport
layer security protocol (TLS) [7, 41]) following the password-based
mutual authentication approach (over TLS) [13]. Based on such a
channel, a service provider can offer services such as printing or
legal advice to members of a certain group while protecting the
groupmembers’ privacy [5]. In the next section, we will particularly
show another application example of GTOTP in constructing a
privacy-preserving proof of location scheme.
In this section, we define the security model and present an
efficient construction for GTOTP. Here, we assume a group with
fixed members.
4.1 Security Model
We consider a group withU members. There is a registration au-
thority (RA) that handles parameter initialization and member en-
rollment. We assume that the RA is trusted by all participants of
the system and works as a certificate authority to digitally sign
information (e.g., group verification state) of members.
Each GTOTP instance has a life-span of ∆t . Each group member
generates one password per ∆s . Since many passwords may cor-
respond to the same verify point, so we assume that each verify
point (if any) has a validity period of ∆e , called the verify epoch.
Syntax. A GTOTP scheme involving U ∈ N parties (or provers)
GP = (ID1, . . . , IDU ), one verifier V, and one registration authority
RA, consists of seven algorithms described below.
• (pms,kRA) ← Setup(1κ ,Ts ,Te ,∆e ,∆s ): This setup algorithm is
run by the RA. It takes as input the security parameter 1κ , the
start and the end time of the protocol instance Ts and Te , the
verify epoch ∆e , and the password generation interval ∆s . It
outputs the system parameters pms and a secret key kRA
$← KRA
for RA, where KRA is a secret key space.
• (skIDj ,vstIDj ) ← PInit(IDj ): This is initialization algorithm run
by the group members. It takes as input the member identity
IDj , and outputs the secret key skIDj
$← KGTOTP and the initial
verification state vstIDj for IDj .
• (vstG, {AxIDj }j ∈[U ]) ← GVSTGen(GP, {vstIDj }j ∈[U ]): This ini-
tialization algorithm is run by theRA. It takes as input the identity
and verification state of all the group members, and outputs the
initial group verification state vstG and auxiliary outputs for the
group members {AxIDj }j ∈[U ].
• sdiIDj ← GetSD(skIDj ,T ): This seed generation algorithm is run
by the group member. It takes as input the secret key skIDj ∈
SGTOTP and a time slot T , and outputs the secret seed sdiIDj for
generating the password at T , where SGTOTP is a secret seed
space.
• pwi,zIDj ← PwGen(sd
i
IDj
,T ): The password generation algorithm
is run by a group member. It takes as input the secret seed sdiIDj
for the time slotT , and outputs one-time password pwi,zIDj , where
z is an index of the password in the i-th verify epoch.
• {0, 1} ← Verify(vstG,pwi,zIDj ,T ): This password verification al-
gorithm is run by the verifier. It takes as input the state vstG,




accepted, and 0 otherwise.
• IDj ← Open(kRA,pwi,zIDj ,T ): This identity extraction algorithm
is run by the RA. It takes as input the key kRA, the password
pwi,zIDj
, and the time slot T , and outputs IDj if successful, and ⊥
otherwise.
Given (pms,kRA) ← Setup(1κ ,Ts ,Te ,∆e ,∆s ), {(skIDj ,vstIDj ) ←
PInit(IDj )}IDj ∈GP and GVST (vstG, {AxIDj }j ∈[U ]) ← GVSTGen(
GP, {vstIDj }j ∈[U ]), the GTOTP scheme is correct if Verify(vstG,
PwGen(sdiIDj ,T ),T ) outputs 1 for all IDj ∈ GP and time slot T ∈
[Ts ,Te ].
Threat Model. We consider the common threats that widely exist
in password-based authentication schemes (e.g., [24, 32, 48]) and
group signatures (e.g., [5, 12]). The provers are honest, but an at-
tacker might corrupt the secret key of a prover. The RA is a trustful
(and non-colluding) third party that will not be corrupted or con-
trolled by any attackers. The communication between a prover and
the RA is secure. The verifier can be malicious, who may be curious
about the identity of a prover. There also exist attackers who can
control the communication among parties, and therefore can in-
tercept, inject, and tamper with the communication. The attackers
may also want to impersonate an honest prover without learning its
secret key. Moreover, the attackers may try to avoid being identified
when she behaves as a malicious prover. We assume that each party
in the system also has an internal clock that is synchronized with
other parties in the system.
Security Definition. Following the game-based approach in [2],
we define two security games for GTOTP to formulate secu-
rity properties regarding anonymity (GTOTP_Anony) and trace-
ability (GTOTP_Trace), respectively. That is, we let Exp ∈
{GTOTP_Anony,GTOTP_Trace} be a variable to indicate one of
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G
Exp
A,GTOTP(κ ,U ,Ts ,Te , ∆e , ∆s ) :
Initialize(GP) : Finalize(b∗, pw ∗,T ∗) :
pms← GTOTP.Setup(1κ , Ts , Te , ∆e , ∆s ) IF Exp = GTOTP_Anony and b = b∗ and no Corrupt query to either ˆID0 or ˆID1
kRA
$← KRA , create list HL← ∅ OUTPUT 1
FOR ∀IDj ∈ GP: (skIDj , vstIDj ) ← GTOTP-MT.PInit(IDj ) and IF Exp = GTOTP_Trace and GTOTP-MT.Verify(vstG, pw∗, T ∗) = 1
(vstG, {AxIDj }IDj ∈GP) ← GTOTP-MT.GVSTGen(GP, {vstIDj }IDj ∈GP) and (GTOTP-MT.Open(kRA, pw∗, T ∗) < (⊥ and GP) or GTOTP-MT.Open(kRA, pw∗, T ∗) = ⊥)
IF Exp = GTOTP_Anony, OUTPUT pms, GP, vstG and (pw∗, T ∗) < HL and no GetNextPw query after time T ∗ − ∆s
IF Exp = GTOTP_Trace, OUTPUT kRA, pms, GP, vstG and no Corrupt query to the owner ID∗ of pw∗
and no CompromiseSD query returns sd iID∗ where i :=
⌈T ∗−Ts ⌉
∆e
Challenge( ˆID0, ˆID1) : OUTPUT 1
IF ( ˆID0, ˆID1) < GP or ˆID0 = ˆID1 , OUTPUT ⊥ OUTPUT 0
b
$← {0, 1}
Suspend game until the start of the next verify epoch GetNextPw() :
sd ˆIDb ← GTOTP-MT.GetSD(sk ˆIDb , Tcurrent) FOR ∀IDj ∈ GP: sd
i
IDj
← GetSD(skIDj , Tcurrent) and pwIDj ← GTOTP-MT.PwGen(sd iIDj , Tcurrent)
pw ˆIDb ← PwGen(sd ˆIDb , Tcurrent) APPEND ({pwIDj }IDj ∈GP∗, Tcurrent) → HL
Suspend game until the start of the next verify epoch OUTPUT {pwIDj }IDj ∈GP∗
OUTPUT sd ˆIDb , pw ˆIDb
ReceivePw(pw ) :
Corrupt(IDj ) : OUTPUT GTOTP-MT.Verify(vstG, pw, Tcurrent)
OUTPUT skIDj
OpenID(pw ,T ) :
CompromiseSD(IDj ) : OUTPUT GTOTP-MT.Open(kRA, pw, T )
OUTPUT sd iIDj ← GetSD(skIDj , Tcurrent)
Figure 1: Procedures Used to Define the Security of a GTOTP Scheme.
the games, where these games will share procedures. We also dis-
cuss the achievable privacy of GTOTP in Appendix B.
We present the relevant procedures of the security games in Fig-
ure 1. The games can be started by calling the Initialize procedure
and ended by calling the Finalize procedure. The adversary can
specify a set of unique identities of her own choice for running the
game when calling Initialize. During the game, the adversary A
can sequentially call other procedures. The games are defined in a
multiparty setting.Wemodel the corruption of parties via aCorrupt
procedure, the compromise of secret seed via CompromiseSD pro-
cedure, and the revelation of identity via OpenID procedure. Be-
sides, the adversary can get passwords of group members via the
GetNextPw procedure, and test the validity of a password via the
ReceivePw procedure.
The traceability property of GTOTP is adapted from the unforge-
ability of TOTP [32] and the traceability of GDS [1]. We note that
this property covers the password unforgeability property that is
similar to the formalization of traceability of GDS [1]. More specifi-
cally, the adversary cannot create a password associated with an
uncompromised secret seed of an uncorrupted member, such that
the password is valid but cannot be opened to the corresponding
member.
Wemodel anonymity using the indistinguishability based formal-
ization widely used in pseudonym schemes [15, 45]. Specifically, we
customize a Challenge( ˆID0, ˆID1) procedure for the GTOTP_Anony
game. That is, the adversary can ask the challenge query at any time
with two honest identities based on which the challenger would flip
a random bit b, and return an unused secret seed and a password of
one of the challenged parties. The returned secret seed will be called
as challenge secret seed, and the verify epoch for the verify-point
generated by the challenge secret seed will be called as challenge
verify epoch. To get an unused challenge secret seed, the challenger
would suspend the game until the start of the next verify epoch,
so that this would invalidate the current verify-point. Since the
adversary can ask GetNextPw() to get the passwords of challenged
parties, the challenger will suspend the game again until the end of
the challenge verify epoch to prevent the adversary from learning
the passwords of the ˆID0 and ˆID1 in the challenge verify epoch
(that would allow the adversary to trivially win the game). Note
that the adversary can ask a Corrupt(IDj ) query to compromise the
secret key of a party IDj and learn all passwords of this party, so
we require all challenge parties to be uncorrupted ( namely, there
is no Corrupt(·) query to them). Moreover, we also allow the ad-
versary to compromise the secret seeds of uncorrupted parties via
the CompromiseSD(·) procedure. Note that our suspensions in the
Challenge procedure ensure that the challenge secret seeds will
not be compromised in the GTOTP_Anony game. Also, A cannot
ask the OpenID query to obtain the identities of challenge parties.
Furthermore, in theGTOTP_Trace gameA should not compromise
the secret seed that is supposed to generate the forged password
pw∗ of the adversary.
The goal of the adversary in the GTOTP_Anony game is to dis-
tinguish the owner of the challenge secret seed from ( ˆID0, ˆID1).
Note that with the given challenge secret seed and password, the
adversary can compute all other passwords of the corresponding
party by herself in the challenge verify epoch. In the GTOTP_Trace
game, the adversary attempts to produce a forgery (pw∗,T ∗), and
we say it wins the game (i.e., the experiment returns 1), if (pw∗,T ∗)
is a valid password-time pair and the opening algorithm returns ⊥,
or some valid identity IDj such that IDj < GP.
Definition 4.1. We say that a GTOTP scheme GTOTP is secure if
for any PPT adversaryA, the advantages AdvGTOTP_AnonyA,GTOTP (pms) :=Pr [GGTOTP_AnonyA,GTOTP (pms) = 1] − 1/2 and AdvGTOTP_TraceA,GTOTP (pms) :=
Pr
[
GGTOTP_TraceA,GTOTP (pms) = 1
]
of A in the corresponding games are
negligible under the parameters pms = (κ,U ,Ts ,Te ,∆e ,∆s ).
4.2 An Efficient GTOTP Scheme
Here we introduce an efficient GTOTP protocol GTOTP-MT.
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Building Blocks. We mainly use an asymmetric TOTP scheme
TOTP, a Merkle tree scheme MT, an unpredictable permutation
scheme [39] π (kp , ·) with a random key kp $← {0, 1}κ , a Bloom
filter BF, a PRF family F, a randomized authenticated symmetric
encryption scheme ASE (i.e., it consists of a randomized encryption
algorithm), and a collision resistant-hash function H1. The permu-
tation scheme π (kp , ·) takes as input a set of elements and outputs
a permuted set. Furthermore, we assume the group members and
RA can establish a mutual authenticated secure channel (MASC)
which protects confidentiality and integrity of exchanged messages
(e.g., using TLS [7, 41]). For privacy, we require the TOTP scheme
to not use any identity relevant information in the whole protocol
execution. For example, the one-way function based TOTP in [28]
meets such a requirement. To use T/Key [32], one can assign each
TOTP instance of a party with a random salt. We also need a TOTP
that a verify pointvpiIDj can be obtained from any passwords being
verified by it. All chain-based TOTP (e.g., [28, 32]) can achieve this
requirement.
A Naive Solution. One solution for realizing GTOTP is to use
multiple instances of a TOTP protocol, for example [28], to generate
passwords. Each instance is used only for a short period ∆e to
avoid linkability between verify points. The number E of the TOTP
instances is determined by the life-span ∆t = Te −Ts and ∆e , that
is E = ∆t /∆e . The seed sdiIDj for the key generation can then be
created by applying a PRF to kIDj . To achieve anonymity, we store
verify points of multiple members into a single Bloom filter BF,
which serves as the group verification state (GVST). The verifier
checks the verify point’s membership against BF, and whether the
password is based on the verify point.
The limitation of this solution is space overhead of the verifica-
tion state, which isO(U ·E). For example, assume a reasonable pass-
word generation frequency of ∆s = 5s , five-day usage ∆t = 432000s ,
a Bloom filter’s false positive rate of ϵ = 40, and the group size of
U = 100, the size of vstG becomes 1.44 · 40 · 100 · ∆t∆s ·
1
1024·1024·8 ≈
59MB. This cost grows larger with more members (larger U ) or
longer usage period (larger ∆t ). Thus, the main challenge in con-
structing a GTOTP scheme is to reduce this cost for a long-time
period and larger group size. We address this by using Merkle tree
to achieve constant-sized verification states.
Overview. We observe that a Merkle tree supports the same func-
tionality of a Bloom filter, that is, to prove the authenticity of the
verify point of a group member. In other words, we can build a
Merkle tree on the verify points generated by the naive scheme
above. This introduces additional cost at the member to store and
send Merkle proofs for the passwords. We choose Merkle tree for
our construction because it has short proofs.
Our first design is to build one single tree for all verify points,
such that the group verification state is the tree root. To achieve
anonymity, we first shuffle the verify-points from group members
using π , in order to remove the relationship among them before
building the Merkle tree. By permuting the leaf nodes, a non-leaf
nodes may be computed based on the verify points from differ-
ent members. However, this permutation destroys the time order
implied by the indices of the verify points. To overcome this, we
use the collision-resistant hash function H1 to explicitly bind each
Figure 2: Overview of GTOTP-MT.GVSTGen for U = 4, E = 2,
and ϕ = 2. Red nodes (shown as an example) in the first Merkle
tree is the Merkle proof of leaf node v̂p1ID1 .
verify point with the index of the verify epoch. We stress that the
above operations will be done by a trustful RA which is not con-
trolled by the attackers, so an attacker cannot distinguish the owner
of the verify points not generated by her.
We note that both the storage cost at each member, and the
verification cost at the verifier, are linear in the height of the tree.
Our final design reduces these costs by partitioning the leaf nodes
into disjoint sets and build a Merkle tree on each set. These trees
have smaller heights than the original one, and the size of the
Merkle proofs of a group member becomes O(E · log
U ·E
ϕ ) which
is practical even when the ∆t is large (e.g., half a year). Finally,
we store the Merkle roots in a Bloom filter. Figure 2 illustrates the
GVST generation process.
To achieve traceability, the RA encrypts each identity E times
with ASE, binding each ciphertext with the corresponding verify
point using H1. The binding combined with the security of the
Merkle tree prevents the encrypted identity from being forged.
Finally, to verify a password for a time slot, the verifier first recovers
the corresponding verify point, checks the Merkle tree proof, and
then verifies that the tree root is in the Bloom filter.
Detailed Construction. Our construction GTOTP-MT, realizes
the seven GTOTP algorithms as follows.
• Setup(1κ ,Ts ,Te ,∆e ,∆s ): RA runs this algorithm to sample a se-
cret key kRA, calculates the number of passwords in a chain
N := (Te −Ts )/∆s and the number of TOTP protocol instances
E := (Te − Ts )/∆e , and sets the start time Ts := Tcurrent to be
current system time. Moreover, It also runs the setup algorithm
hk ← H1.Setup(1κ ) to initialize a hash key hk , and generates a
parameter ϕ denoting the number of sub-sets of verify points.
A random key kp
$← {0, 1}κ for permutation is sampled. The
parameters pms = (hk,kp ,N ,E,Ts ,Te ,ϕ) are returned.
• PInit(IDj ): The group member IDj first runs (pms,kIDj ) ←
F.Setup(1κ ) to sample a random key kIDj
$← KPRF as its secret
key, whereKPRF is a secret key space of PRF. For i ∈ [E], IDj first
initializes the i-th protocol instance pmsi := TOTP.Setup(1κ ,
Ti ,Ti + ∆e ,∆s ), whereTi = Ti−1 + ∆e andT0 := Ts . Then it com-
putes the i-th secret seed sdiIDj := F(kIDj , IDj | |i), and the verify
point vpiIDj := TOTP.PInit(sd
i
ID). This algorithm returns secret
key skIDj = kIDj and verification state vstIDj = {vpiIDj }i ∈[E].
• GVSTGen(GP, {vstIDj }j ∈[U ]): Upon receiving all verification
states from the group members via a MASC, for j ∈ [U ]
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and i ∈ [E], RA computes CiIDj = ASE.Enc(kRA, IDj ), and
updates the verify point v̂piIDj := H1(vpiIDj | |C
i
IDj
| |i) to bind
the index and identity-ciphertext CiIDj to the verify point. As
ASE.Enc is randomized, we have that CiIDj , C
i+1
IDj
. Let V =
{vstIDj }j ∈[U ] = {v̂piIDj }i ∈[E], j ∈[U ]. RA shuffles V to generate a
random set V ′ := π (kp ,V ). Next, RA divides leaf nodes in V ′
into ϕ sub-sets {V ′1 ,V ′2 , . . . ,V ′ϕ }. Then, RA generates ϕ Merkle
trees {MTrι := MT.Build(V ′ι )}ι∈[ϕ], and computes the Merkle
proof of each leaf node as Pfv̂piIDj
:= MT.GetProof(MTrι , v̂piIDj )
for all i ∈ [E] and j ∈ [U ], where MTrι is the Merkle tree
containing the leaf node v̂piIDj . To this end, RA initiates an
empty Bloom filter instance BF := BF.Init(ϵ,ϕ), and inserts
all Merkle tree roots {MTrι .Rt}ι∈[ϕ] into a Bloom filter, i.e.,
BF.Insert(MTrι .Rt) for all ι ∈ [ϕ]. Eventually, RA sends back
the corresponding Merkle proofs of the corresponding leaf nodes
as auxiliary output of this algorithm AxIDj = {Pfv̂piIDj }i ∈[E] to
each party IDj via a MASC. Each party privately stores secret
key skIDj := kIDj , random identity-ciphertexts {CiIDj }i ∈[E], and
Merkle proofs {Pfv̂piIDj }i ∈[E]. The initial group verification state
is vstGP := BF which has a constant-size in O(ϕ).
• PwGen(skIDj , Tcurrent): The party IDj first computes the index
i associated with Tcurrent as i := ⌈T−Ts ⌉∆e . Next, IDj computes




, Tcurrent), where z is password index
in the i-th verify epoch, i.e., z := ⌈Tcurrent−Ts−i ·∆e ⌉∆s . The password






• GetSD(skIDj ,T ): It calculates the index of sub-chain i := ⌈T−Ts ⌉∆e
and returns i-th seed sdiIDj := F(kIDj , IDj | |i).
• Verify(vstG,pwi,zIDj ,T ): The verifier first initializes the verifica-
tion result vr := 0, and computes the verify point vpiIDj based on
pwi,zIDj




Next, the verifier computes the corresponding root MTrι .Rt
based on v̂piIDj and the Merkle proof Pfv̂piIDj
. Eventually, the
verifier sets vr := 1 if and only if BF.Check(MTrι .Rt) = 1 and
TOTP.Verify(
vpiIDj
, ¯pwi,zIDj ,T ) = 1, and outputs vr .
• Open(kRA,pwi,zIDj ,T ): If Verify(vstG,pw
i,z
IDj
,T ) = 0, then RA
aborts. Otherwise, RA returns IDj := ASE.Dec(kRA,CiIDj ).
Security Analysis. Our construction achieves both anonymity
and traceability, as stated by the two theorems below.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that the time-based one-time passwords
scheme TOTP, the collision-resistant hash function H1, the pseudo-
random function family F, the Merkle tree schemeMT are secure, π
is an unpredictable permutation function, the authenticated symmet-
ric encryption ASE is randomized and secure, and the Bloom filter
has a negligible false positive error 2−ϵ . Then GTOTP-MT provides
anonymity.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is included in Appendix C. Here, we
sketch the high-level idea behind the proof. Since the secret seeds
created by F are indistinguishable and the outputs of ASE.Enc and
H1 are random, the adversary cannot distinguish two verify points
computed from these challenge secret seed and password. As the
permutation is unpredictable, the adversary cannot learn the leaf
nodes’ owners (when they are not corrupted) from the Merkle
proofs. Furthermore, since each Merkle tree root is mapped tom
bit positions of the Bloom filter, and many roots may share the
same bit positions, the adversary cannot recover the relationship
of two inserted roots from the Bloom filter. Finally, because ASE is
IND-CCA secure, the adversary cannot extract the member identity
from the ciphertext included in the challenge password.
Theorem 4.3. With the same assumptions in Theorem 4.2,
GTOTP-MT provides traceability.
The proof for Theorem 4.3 is included in Appendix D. We first
exclude the collision among secret keys of parties based on the
security of PRF. Next, we change the game to exclude the collision
among the verify points due to the security of H1. Then, we reduce
the security to PRF again, so that we can replace the secret seeds of
each TOTP instance with random values. Now, if the adversary can
forge an unused password, then it must be able to break the security
of either the TOTP scheme or the Merkle tree. Since the adversary
cannot forge the Merkle proofs, it cannot bind a password to a
maliciously chosen ciphertext.
5 PROOF OF LOCATION
This section presents a novel application of GTOTP that enables
an efficient, privacy-preserving proof of location (PoL) scheme. A
PoL is a verifiable, tamper-proof statement attesting that a user is
at a specific location at a specific time. A PoL scheme has many
real-world applications, such as address verification, tracking and
tracing of goods in supply chain systems, monitoring of health
status, or humanitarian aid. For example, a bank customer can use
PoL to securely prove the physical presence at a certain location to
the bank as part of the verification of transactions. Due to the global
COVID-19 pandemic, there is an increasing demand for contact
tracing which is based on the close proximity of users. A PoL can
help solve this problem. In this work, we focus on decentralized
settings, that is, the participants of PoL can choose for themselves
the source of locations, e.g., GPS or location beacons [31].
5.1 System Model
The PoL system consists of five entities: prover, witness, verifier,
Registration Authority (RA), and Public Bulletin Board (PBB). The
prover is a user device, e.g. a mobile phone or a smart vehicle, that
generates a location proof for a specific location and time. The
witness is a device near the prover that generates a proof ceritifying
the proximity between itself and the prover. A witness could be
a device like the prover, or a location beacon like a road side unit
(RSU). The verifier is the entity that verifies the prover’s location
base on the proof. The RA handles enrollment of the prover, witness,
and verifier. In particular, it ceritfies the other entities’ keys, and
reveals their identities if necessary.
The PBB is a secure storage to which entities can publish mes-
sages and read each other’s messages. It provides append-only and
integrity properties such that messages stored in PBB cannot be
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deleted or modified. We use PBB to realize anonymous data ex-
change and storage. In particular, the data owner and PBB establish
a unilateral (PBB-only) authenticated secure channel [7, 8, 41] to
protect integrity of the data while hiding the data owner’s identity.
One popular instantiation of PBB is Certificate Transparency [16],
another is blockchains. We refer the reader to [6] for the formal
model of PBB.
Syntax. We consider a PoL scheme with the following interactive
sub-protocols.
• (vkG, {skIDi }i ∈[U ],kRA) ← Reдistration(GP,Ts ,Te ,∆e ,∆s ). RA
and a group of parties with identities GP = {IDi }i ∈[U ] (which
could be either prover or witness) can run this protocol together
to generate a group verification key vkG based on the public
protocol parameters (including the start and end timesTs andTe ,
length of each verify epoch ∆e , and proof generation generation
interval ∆s ). Meanwhile, each group member IDi (for i ∈ [U ])
will keep the generated secret key skIDi privately. RA generates
a secret key kRA for realizing traceability.
• LPP ← Location-Proo f -Gen(skP , {skWj }j ∈[M ], vkG, LP ,
{LWj }j ∈[M ]). A prover P and M witnesses {Wj }j ∈[M ] run this
protocol to generate the location proof LPP for the prover’s lo-
cation LP , based on their secret keys (skP , {skWj }j ∈[M ]), wit-
nesses’ locations {LWj }j ∈[M ], current time slot Tcurrent, and ver-
ification key vkG, whereM is the number of the witnesses and(P, {Wj }j ∈[M ]) ∈ GP.
• vr ← Veri f ication(vkG, LPP , skP , {skWj }j ∈[M ], LP ). The veri-
fier V can check the validity of the location proof LPP with the
help of the proof contributors including the prover P and the
corresponding witnesses {Wj }j ∈[M ], in which the proof contrib-
utors may provide V necessary confidential information used to
compute LPP . The verification result vr ∈ {0, 1} is returned.
A PoL scheme has an additional non-interactive algorithm:
• cIDi ← Open(kRA, LPP , i): This is an identity extraction algo-
rithm (run by RA) that takes as input a location proof LPP , and
outputs the identity cIDi of the i-th contributor of the proof or a
failure symbol, where cIDi ∈ GP.
The correctness of PoL means that if honest entities with adjacent
locations follows the algorithms, they will generate location proofs
that pass the verification.
5.2 An Efficient Privacy-Preserving Proof of
Location Scheme
In this section, we introduce an efficient PoL construction based on
our proposed GTOTP.
Threat Model. Here we consider three most desirable security
properties including anonymity, traceability and location privacy in
our PoL scheme. The threats against anonymity and traceability are
similar to these against GTOTP. Informally speaking, anonymity
requires that the prover can attest its location to the verifier while
preserving the anonymity of all other participants. A PoL scheme
with traceability should prevent the adversaries from forging a valid
location proof that involves either an invalid or a dishonest identity.
Although we allow the attackers to corrupt participants, we assume
the majority of the witnesses and the prover are uncorrupted while
jointly generating a location proof. Moreover, location privacy is
achieved if no adversaries can infer any information of the loca-
tions of the uncorrupted witnesses from the location proofs. In
Appendix E, we define a security model to formulate those security
properties.
Building Blocks.Our construction uses a GTOTP schemeGTOTP,
a PRF family F, a cryptographic hash function H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Rh ,
and a PPLP scheme PPLP. H2 is used to realize a random oracle
based commitment scheme (as in [46]). We assume that the entities
establish either mutual authenticated or unilateral (server-only)
authenticated secure channel depending on their roles.
Figure 3: Overview of Proof of Location.
Overview.One common approach for a prover to attest its presence
at a certain location is to collect proofs from nearby witnesses
who can testify the prover’s location. However, there are three
problems: (i) guaranteeing the anonymity of entities; (ii) protecting
the witnesses’ location privacy; (iii) binding the location proofs
with the entities.
To solve these problems, we first leverage our new GTOTP
scheme to achieve anonymity with efficiency. We build a GTOTP
group with members being either the witnesses or prover. We as-
sume that the location proof requests and responses are transmitted
via a short-range communication (e.g., Bluetooth), such that only
the nearby witnesses can receive proof requests from the prover.
However, the prover still needs to show a location proximity proof
with the witness to the verifier. To protect the witnesses’ location
privacy, we leverage a PPLP scheme to attest the proximity between
the witness and the prover. We use ephemeral public keys, each of
which is associated with a location proof, for the PPLP scheme to
ensure privacy.
To address the third problem, we combine a hash-based commit-
ment scheme with the above GTOTP scheme and PPLP scheme. In
particular, the prover and witnesses commit the location proximity
proof generated by PPLP to the verifier as the location proof. These
commitments are called location commitments. Here, the key of the
location commitment is the secret seed of the GTOTP scheme. Note
that the secret seed is verifiable since it can be used to generate
the passwords in GTOTP. To enable the prover to verify the mes-
sages (including the location proofs) from witnesses, each witness
generates a commitment keyed by the next password being used
to commit the sent message. Such a commitment is called message
commitment. We leverage a password to be the commitment key
rather than a key derived from the secret seed since the message
commitment key should be verifiable in a shorter time than the
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life-span of a secret seed. During verification, the prover and the
witnesses can open their commitments to the verifier to prove the
location. The verifier accepts the location of prover if all involved
passwords and commitments of witnesses and prover are valid,
and most of the witnesses’ locations are close to that of the prover.
Figure 3 illustrates the steps for generating location proofs.
Detailed Construction. The details of sub-protocols Registration,
Location-Proof-Gen, and Verification are shown in Figure 4, 5, and 6.
The open algorithm is realized as follows.
Open(kRA, LP , i). This algorithm invokes the GTOTP-MT.Open al-
gorithm. Specifically, RA retrieves the password pwi of the i-th
contributor and the time-stamp T of the proof, and returns
GTOTP-MT.Open(kRA,pwi ,T ).
Application to Contact Tracing for COVID-19. Our PoL
scheme can support contact tracing, because the one-time pass-
words are exchanged via short-range communication, and the pass-
words of the contributors are recorded in the location proof. Such
grouped passwords indicate contact. Meanwhile, a prover can reg-
ularly run the PoL protocol, e.g., every minute. More specifically,
when the prover is confirmed to have been infected, she can let the
verifier (who can be a hospital) publish the corresponding location
proof in a high risk list. The RA extracts identities of the contribu-
tors of the location proof, and informs the corresponding witnesses
about potential transmission. The witnesses of a location proof
may not cover all close-contacts of the prover. Bluetooth-based
contact tracing schemes [42, 43] have certain limitations, because
some people may refuse to run the contact-tracing application, or
they do not have any Bluetooth-enabled devices. However, in our
scheme, after the verifier (anonymously) releases the prover’s past
locations after verifying the corresponding location proofs (gener-
ated by PoL), the other entities can check whether they are in close
contact with the prover. In other words, our scheme can help other
people outside of the system achieve contact tracing based on the
possibly contaminated location released by our scheme. This is not
achievable by other proximity-tracing only schemes [42, 43]. The
contact locations may also help the centre for disease control to
make strategic decisions to stop the propagation of the Covid-19.
Security Analysis.We show that our PoL scheme achieves secu-
rity via the following theorems. Due to limit of space, their proofs
will be given in the full version of this paper.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that the GTOTP scheme and the PPLP
scheme are secure, and the hash function H2 is modeled as a random
oracle. Then PoL achieves anonymity.
Since the public keys used for running the PPLP scheme are
ephemeral for generating a location proof, they do not leak any
identity related information. In addition, the anonymity of the
GTOTP scheme implies the privacy of the entities in PoL.
Theorem 5.2. With the same assumptions in Theorem 5.1, PoL
also achieves traceability.
This property is derived directly from the traceability of GTOTP.
We note that the traceability of GTOTP covers the unforgeability
of unused passwords and secret, the commitments computed using
them are also unforgeable.
Theorem 5.3. With the same assumptions in Theorem 5.1, PoL
achieves location privacy.
Since the adversary cannot forge the commitments due to the
traceability property, the location privacy of the entities in PoL is
derived from that of the PPLP scheme.
Discussion on Insider Threats. In recent years, insider at-
tacks [35, 40, 47] have become amajor threats against cryptographic
schemes. Our PoL construction can resist against insider witnesses,
who intend to falsify or tamper with the location proof, as long as
the dishonest witnesses are the minority in generating the target
location proof. To establish the majority of the honest witnesses,
the prover can invite more witnesses for executing the PoL proto-
col at a time. However, our construction cannot prevent an insider
prover from installing malicious witnesses to provide dishonest
proof of a location. The detailed solutions regarding preventing
insider attackers are out of the scope of this paper. Alternatively, we
allow the RA to reveal the identity of any misbehaved participants
due to the traceability of PoL. To prevent insider prover, it might be
possible to restrict the prover to generate the location proof with
witnesses which encompass physically faithful location beacons
(such as FOAM [31]). However, it is an open question to design a
PoL scheme that can resist insider attackers without trustworthy
location beacons.
6 EVALUATION
We implement our GTOTP-MT and PoL schemes on Raspberry Pi
3. For the GTOTP-MT implementation, we use the TOTP scheme
with a single hash-chain introduced in [28]. The hash functions,
including H1 and H2, are implemented using SHA256. We imple-
ment the PPLP scheme as proposed by Järvinen et al. [25, 26] which
uses ElGamal based additively homomorphic encryption and Ellip-
tic Curve Cryptography (ECC). We use NIST Curve P-256 for the
implementation. Since all entities can share ECC parameters, the
expensive operations in PPLP.LPResp, which is to initialize blind
distance sets by, are performed offline, as in [25, 26]. We do not
report this cost in our experiments. The authenticated symmetric
encryption ASE is implemented as 128-bit AES-GCM-SIV [19, 20].
In the experiments, we set a fixed life-span ∆e = 5 minutes (m)
for each verify point, but vary the number of verify points for each
entity. We set the password generation interval ∆s = 5 seconds (s),
which gives N = 60. We set ϵ = 40 for the Bloom filter, which is
sufficient to guarantee a negligible false-positive rate for a duration
of less than 1 year. The number of Merkle trees in the GTOTP-MT
scheme is ϕ = 213 = 8192, and the distance threshold in PoL is
θ = 50 (meters).
We run prover, verifier, and witness on Raspberry Pi 3, and the
RA on a PC with Intel i7 CPU and 2GB RAM. The results reported
below are averaged over 1000 runs. We note that our current im-
plementation is not yet optimized, for example, we do not exploit
all available CPU cores. In other words, the results below can be
further improved with multi-threadings.
6.1 Performance of GTOTP
Initialization Time. Figure 7 (a) shows the computational cost of
GTOTP-MT.PInit. Although the cost increases linearly with E, we
note that each initialization takes approximately 10ms, which is
practical.
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Input: Group members with identities GP = {IDi }i∈[U ] which are either witness or prover, the start and end times Ts and Te , length of each verify-epoch ∆e , and proof
generation generation interval ∆s
Output: Verification key vkG
(1) RA generates system parameters by running pms1 := GTOTP.Setup(1κ , Ts , Te , ∆e , ∆s ) and pms2 := PPLP.Setup(1κ ) publishes the parameter pms = (pms1, pms2).
(2) Each group member IDi initializes its secret key and verification state by running (sk1IDi , vstIDi ) := GTOTP-MT.PInit(IDi ) and sk
2
IDi
:= F.Setup(1κ ), and sends
vstIDi to RA via a mutual authenticated secure channel as registration request.
(3) Upon receiving registration request, RA generates the group verification state (vstG, {AxIDj }j∈U ) := GVSTGen(GP, {vstIDj }j∈[U ]), and sends AxIDj (if any) back to
the corresponding party via the secure channel.
(4) RA generates the group verification state as vstG := GTOTP-MT.GVSTGen(GP, {vstIDj }j∈[U ]), and publishes the verification key vkG = vstG .
(5) Each party IDi keeps its secret key skIDi = (sk1IDi , sk
2
IDi
) privately, and the prover would additionally store a counter cnt (which is initialized to be zero) to record the
times of proof request.
Figure 4: Registration of PoL
Input: Prover P’s secret key skP and location LP ,M witnesses’ secret keys {skWj }j∈[M ] and their locations {LWj }j∈[M ] , current time slot Tcurrent , and verification key vkG
Output: Location proof LPP
(1) The prover P generates a location proof request via the following steps:
- Compute cnt := cnt + 1 and the secret seed rkcnt = F(sk2P, ‘PPLP’ | |cnt ), and run key generation algorithm of the PPLP scheme (epkcntP , eskcntP ) :=
PPLP.KGen(rkcnt ) to get an ephemeral public and secret key pair;
- Compute the i-th secret seed sd iP := GTOTP-MT.GetSD(sk1P, Tcurrent), and password pw i,zP := GTOTP-MT.PwGen(sd iP, Tcurrent);
- Encrypt its location CP := PPLP.LPInit(pkcntP , LP ).
(2) P broadcasts (pw i,zP , CP ) to nearby witnesses as location proof challenge via a short range communication channel (such as Bluetooth);
(3) Upon receiving (pw i,zP , CP ), each witness rejects if GTOTP-MT.Verify(vstG, pw i,zP , Tcurrent) = 0, otherwise it does the following:
- Generate the PPLP response CWj := PPLP.LPResp(epkcntP , CP, LWj );
- Run sd iWj := GTOTP-MT.GetSD(sk
1
Wj
, Tcurrent), and compute pw i,zWj := GTOTP-MT.PwGen(sd
i
Wj
, Tcurrent) for the current time slot Tcurrent .
- Abort if Tcurrent + ∆s belongs to the next verify-epoch (which means there is no enough password to use in the current verify-epoch), otherwise initialize a commitment
key using the next password pw i,z+1Wj := GTOTP-MT.PwGen(sd
i
Wj
, Tcurrent + ∆s );
- Set TrWj := pw
i,z
P | |CP | |CWj | |LWj | |Tcurrent , and compute the location relevant commitment LCTWj := H2(sd iWj | |TrWj ) and message relevant commitment
MCTWj := H2(pw i,z+1Wj | |LCTWj );
- Send its proof piece (pw iWj , CWj , LCTWj , MCTWj ) to prover P via a short range communication channel;
- Record the tuple (Tcurrent, CWj ) locally, and put (pw i,z+1Wj , MCTWj ) on a public bulletin board after time Tcurrent + 2∆s .
(4) Upon receiving all proof pieces RLP = {pw i,zWj , CWj , LCTWj , MCTWj }j∈[M ] from witnesses, P removes invalid pair from RLP if one of the following conditions holds:
- GTOTP-MT.Verify(vstG, pw i,zWj , Tcurrent) = 0;
- MCTWj , H2(pw i,z+1Wj | |LCTWj ), where pw
i,z+1
Wj
can be obtained from the public bulletin board after time Tcurrent + ∆s ;
- 0 = PPLP.LPCheck(eskcntP , CWj ).
(5) If the number of valid location proof pieces in RLP is equal or greater than ρ ≤ M , P prepares a transcript TrP := epkcntP | |RLP | |LP | |Tcurrent | |cnt and computes the
location relevant commitment LCTP := H2(sd iP | |TrP ); otherwise P aborts with failure.
(6) P sends the location proof LPP = (pw i,zP , epkcntP , Tcurrent, LCTP, RLP ) to verifier V , and put LP on a public bulletin board.
(7) V records LPP if: for all ID ∈ {P, {Wj }j∈[M ] }, GTOTP-MT.Verify(vstG, pw i,zID , Tcurrent) = 1
Figure 5: Location Proof Generation of PoL
Input: Verification key vkG , location proof LPP , prover P’s secret key skP , M witnesses’ secret key {skWj }j∈[M ] , and location LP relevant to LPP
Output: Verification result in {0, 1}
(1) P does the following:
- Get Td ∈ LPP and return ⊥ if Tcurrent and Td belong to the same verify-epoch;
- Compute the i-th secret seed sd iP := GTOTP-MT.GetSD(sk1P, Td ), and t -th the ephemeral random seed rkt = PRF(sk1P, ‘PPLP’ | |cnt ′);
- If sd iID has expired, open (sd iP, rkt , LP ) to verifier V over a unilateral authenticated secure channel, otherwise abort;
- Put all passwords of witnesses in LPP as testifying request on the public bulletin board.




and LWj to verifier V over a unilateral authenticated secure channel analogously;








P ) := PPLP.KGen(rkcnt ′ ) is not in LPP , , where cnt ′ ∈ LPP ;
- A password computed based on sd iID , i.e., pw
i,z
ID := GTOTP-MT.PwGen(sd iID, Td ), is invalid or pw i,zID < LPP ;
- LCTID , H2(sd iID | |TrID) where LCTID ∈ LPP and TrID = RLP | |CP | |Ti if ID = P and TrID = pw iP | |CP | |CWj | |Ti otherwise;
- ID = P and CP is an invalid ciphertext of LP that is verified based on the secret key skP .
- ID =Wj and 0 = PPLP.LPCheck(eskcnt ′P , CWj ).
(4) V returns 0 (meaning invalid location proof) if the number of invalid location proof pieces (as checked above) is not greater than ρ ≤ M , otherwise 1 is returned;
Figure 6: Verification of PoL
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Figure 8: Runtime of GTOTP-MT.Verify and Communication
Cost.
the next verify epoch. This way, the prover always has one full
segment of passwords in memory, and only needs to compute one
hash function in the average case, and one more PRF in the worst
case to switch TOTP instances. In our experiments, we observe that
the cost is low: 4.12`𝑠 and 19.1`𝑠 for the average and worst case,
respectively.
Group Verification State Generation Time. Figure 7 (b) shows
the cost ofGTOTP-MT.GVSTGenwith increasing𝑈 ·𝐸. As expected,
this cost grows linearly with the total number of verify points.
Each verify point contributes less than 1ms to the total time. We
emphasize that this cost can be significantly improved with better
hardware and implementation.
Password Verification Time. We measure the worst-case perfor-
mance, in which the password being verified is the last one in a
TOTP instance. The verifier needs to first go through the whole
chain to verify it, which requires 𝑁 hash functions, then verify
the Merkle proof associated with the password, which requires
log(𝑈 ·𝐸)/𝜙 times function. On average, the verifier may only com-
pute 𝑁 /2 hash functions per verify point. Figure 8 (a) shows verifi-
cation costs in terms of the height of the Merkle trees. It can be seen
that the verification time is in the order of milliseconds, which is
practical. Since the chain length 𝑁 is fixed, the costs vary in terms
of the height of Merkle trees. As 𝑁 is larger than the height, one
can reduce the cost by decreasing the life-span of each verify point.
Identity Open Time. The overhead of GTOTP-MT.Open consists
of the costs of the verification algorithm and a decryption of ASE.
The performance of GTOTP-MT.Verify is 10 times faster on RA
(simulated by PC) than on the Raspberry Pi (as shown in Figure 8).
The runtime of ASE.Dec is about 0.5`𝑠 on PC.
Communication Cost. The communication cost is determined
by the size of the password, which consists of a TOTP password
and the Merkle proof. Figure 8 (b) shows the communication cost,
which increases with the height of the Merkle tree, as expected.
Even for big trees with height of 60, the verifier receives less than
2KB for each verify point.
6.2 Performance of PoL
During registration, PoL mainly invoke the GTOTP algorithms,
thus its cost is the sum of the cost of GTOTP-MT.PInit and
GTOTP-MT.GVSTGen. In the PoL experiments, we fix the height
of the Merkle tree to be log
𝑈 ·𝐸
𝜙 = 30 to reduce the dimension of the
parameters.
ProofGenerationTime.Wemeasure the time of proof generation
(PfGen) as the sum of the cost of the prover and the witnesses.
Table 1 summarizes the results for different number of witnesses
𝑀 . The prover performs 4 + 𝑀 (?̃? + log
𝑈 ·𝐸
𝜙 +2) hash evaluations
and 𝑀 + 10 EC point multiplications (EPM), where ?̃? = 𝑁 for
worst case and ?̃? = 𝑁 /2 for average case. The main cost of the
witness consists of 𝑁 + log
𝑈 ·𝐸
𝜙 +8 hash evaluations and 12 EC point
multiplications.
Table 1: Runtimes of Location Proof Generation and Verifi-




Prover Witness Total Verifier
5 0.116/0.133 0.089/0.098 0.205/0.231 0.00065 1.16
10 0.237/0.276 0.089/0.098 0.326/0.347 0.0011 2.17
15 0.331/0.382 0. 0.089/0.098 0.42/0.48 0.0018 3.19
Verification Time. During verification, the prover and the wit-
nesses open their secret seeds. This opening requires one PRF evalu-
ation, which takes 10`𝑠 . Table 1 reports the cost of the verifier which
includes 5𝑀 hash evaluations and 2𝑀 EC point multiplications.
Proof Size. Table 1 shows the sizes of the location proofs (PfSize)
when the Merkle’s tree height is 30. Each time stamp costs 32 bits,
H2 costs 256 bits, and an EC point (P) 448 bit. Each ciphertext has the
size of 128 bits. Thus, the total size is 32+2H2+𝑃+(3𝐻+2𝑃+𝐶)∗𝑀 =
(992+1792𝑀) bits. Even with𝑀 = 15, each proof is only 3KB, which
is practical.
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6.3 Comparison
(G)TOTP Comparison.Here we generically compareGTOTP-MT
with a state-of-the-arts TOTP scheme [32] and a group signature
scheme [12] from the perspectives of security properties and perfor-
mance. In the comparison, we use the same setting and parameters
as in the above benchmarks. We let ‘PwSize’ denote the sie of pass-
word (which implies the communication cost), ‘Unforg’ denote the
unforeability, ‘BFc’ denote the cost of BF .Check, and ‘BFi’ denote
the cost of BF .Insert. Meanwhile, we compare the worst-case per-
formance between GTOTP and TOTP for simplicity. Moreover, we
let ‘Ex’ and ‘Par’ denote an exponentiation and a pairing operation
relative to bilinear groups, respectively.
The comparison results are shown in Table 2. The initializa-
tion and password generation algorithms of GTOTP-MT scheme
Figure 7: Runtimes of GTOTP-MT.PInit and
GTOTP-MT.GVSTGen.
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Figure 8: Runtime of GTOTP-MT.Verify and Communication
Cost.
the next verify epoch. This way, the prover always has one full
segment of passwords in memory, and only needs to compute one
hash function in the average case, and one more PRF in the worst
case to switch TOTP instances. In our experiments, we observe that
the cost is low: 4.12`𝑠 and 19.1`𝑠 for the average and worst case,
respectively.
Group Verification State Generation Time. Figure 7 (b) shows
the cost ofGTOTP-MT.GVSTGenwith increasing𝑈 ·𝐸. As expected,
this cost grows linearly with the total number of verify points.
Each verify point contributes less than 1ms to the total time. We
emphasize that this cost can be significantly improved with better
hardware and implementation.
Password Verification Time. We measure the worst-case perfor-
mance, in which the password being verified is the last one in a
TOTP instance. The verifier needs to first go through the whole
chain to verify it, which requires 𝑁 hash functions, then verify
the Merkle proof associated with the password, which requires
log(𝑈 ·𝐸)/𝜙 times function. On average, the verifier may only com-
pute 𝑁 /2 hash functions per verify point. Figure 8 (a) shows verifi-
cation costs in terms of the height of the Merkle trees. It can be seen
that the verification time is in the order of milliseconds, which is
practical. Since the chain length 𝑁 is fixed, the costs vary in terms
of the height of Merkle trees. As 𝑁 is larger than the height, one
can reduce the cost by decreasing the life-span of each verify point.
Identity Open Time. The overhead of GTOTP-MT.Open consists
of the costs of the verification algorithm and a decryption of ASE.
The performance of GTOTP-MT.Verify is 10 times faster on RA
(simulated by PC) than on the Raspberry Pi (as shown in Figure 8).
The runtime of ASE.Dec is about 0.5`𝑠 on PC.
Communication Cost. The communication cost is determined
by the size of the password, which consists of a TOTP password
and the Merkle proof. Figure 8 (b) shows the communication cost,
which increases with the height of the Merkle tree, as expected.
Even for big trees with height of 60, the verifier receives less than
2KB for each verify point.
6.2 Performance of PoL
During registration, PoL mainly invoke the GTOTP algorithms,
thus its cost is the sum of the cost of GTOTP-MT.PInit and
GTOTP-MT.GVSTGen. In the PoL experiments, we fix the height
of the Merkle tree to be log
𝑈 ·𝐸
𝜙 = 30 to reduce the dimension of the
parameters.
ProofGenerationTime.Wemeasure the time of proof generation
(PfGen) as the sum of the cost of the prover and the witnesses.
Table 1 summarizes the results for different number of witnesses
𝑀 . The prover performs 4 + 𝑀 (?̃? + log
𝑈 ·𝐸
𝜙 +2) hash evaluations
and 𝑀 + 10 EC point multiplications (EPM), where ?̃? = 𝑁 for
worst case and ?̃? = 𝑁 /2 for average case. The main cost of the
witness consists of 𝑁 + log
𝑈 ·𝐸
𝜙 +8 hash evaluations and 12 EC point
multiplications.
Table 1: Runtimes of Location Proof Generation and Verifi-




Prover Witness Total fier
5 0.116/0.133 0.089/0.098 0.205/0.231 0.00065 1.16
10 0.237/0.276 0.089/0.098 0.326/0.347 0. 11 2.17
15 0.331/0.382 0. .089/ .098 0.42/0.48 0.0018 3.19
Verification Time. During verification, the prover and the wit-
nesses open their secret seeds. This opening requires one PRF evalu-
ation, which takes 10`𝑠 . Table 1 reports the cost of the verifier which
includes 5𝑀 hash evaluations and 2𝑀 EC point multiplications.
Proof Size. Table 1 shows the sizes of the location proofs (PfSize)
when the Merkle’s tree height is 30. Each time stamp costs 32 bits,
H2 costs 256 bits, and an EC point (P) 448 bit. Each ciphertext has the
size of 128 bits. Thus, the total size is 32+2H2+𝑃+(3𝐻+2𝑃+𝐶)∗𝑀 =
(992+1792𝑀) bits. Even with𝑀 = 15, each proof is only 3KB, which
is practical.
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6.3 Comparison
(G)TOTP Comparison.Here we generically compareGTOTP-MT
with a state-of-the-arts TOTP scheme [32] and a group signature
scheme [12] from the perspectives of security properties and perfor-
mance. In the comparison, we use the same setting and parameters
as in the above benchmarks. We let ‘PwSize’ denote the sie of pass-
word (which implies the communication cost), ‘Unforg’ denote the
unforeability, ‘BFc’ denote the cost of BF .Check, and ‘BFi’ denote
the cost of BF .Insert. Meanwhile, we compare the worst-case per-
formance between GTOTP and TOTP for simplicity. Moreover, we
let ‘Ex’ and ‘Par’ denote an exponentiation and a pairing operation
relative to bilinear groups, respectively.
The comparison results are shown in Table 2. The initializa-
tion and password generation algorithms of GTOTP-MT scheme
Figure 8: Runtime of GTOTP-MT.Verify and Com unication
Cost.
Password Generation Time. To evaluate the cost of password
generation, we assume that there is enough storage for caching
passwords [28]. This is reasonable since each TOTP instance is used
only for a sh rt verify epoch with a small nu b r of passwords.
In particular, for N = 60 the storage cost is less han 2KB. Once
the GTOTP instance starts, the prove can use one password in
on segment in the reverse order and generates one password in
the next verify epoch. This way, the prover always has one full
segment of passwords in memory, and only needs to compute one
hash func ion in the average case, and one more PRF in the worst
case to switch TOTP instances. In our experi ents, we observe that
th cost is low: 4.12µs and 19.1µs for the average and worst case,
respectively.
Group Verification State Generation Time. Figure 7 (b) shows
the cost ofGTOTP-MT.GVSTGenwith increasingU ·E. As expected,
this cost grows linearly with the total number of verify points.
Each verify point contributes less than 1ms to the total time. We
emphasize that this cost can be significantly improved with better
hardware and implementation.
Password Verification Time. We measure the worst-case perfor-
mance, in which the password being verified is the last one in a
TOTP instance. The verifier needs to first go through the whole
chain to verify it, which requires N hash functions, then verify
the Merkle proof associated with the password, which requires
log(U ·E)/ϕ times function. On average, the verifier may only com-
pute N /2 hash functions per verify point. Figure 8 (a) shows verifi-
cation costs in terms of the height of the Merkle trees. It can be seen
that the verification time is in the order of milliseconds, which is
practical. Since the chain length N is fixed, the costs vary in terms
of the height of Merkle trees. As N is larger than the height, one
can reduce the cost by decreasing the life-span of each verify point.
Identity Open Time. The overhead of GTOTP-MT.Open consists
of the costs of the verification algorithm and a decryption of ASE.
The performance of GTOTP-MT.Verify is 10 times faster on RA
(simulated by PC) than on the Raspberry Pi (as shown in Figure 8).
The runtime of ASE.Dec is about 0.5µs on PC.
Communication Cost. The communication cost is determined
by the size of the password, which consists of a TOTP password
and the Merkle proof. Figure 8 (b) shows the communication cost,
which increases with the height of the Merkle tree, as expected.
Even for big tr es wi h height of 60, the v rifier receives less than
2KB for each verify point.
6.2 Perfo ma ce of PoL
During registration, PoL mainly invoke the GTOTP algorithms,
thus its cost is the sum of the cost of GTOTP-MT.PInit and
GTOTP-MT.GVSTGen. In the PoL experiments, we fix the height
of the Merkle tree t be log(U ·E)/ϕ = 30 to reduce the dimension
of the par meters.
ProofGenerationTime.Wemeasure the time of proof generation
(PfGen) as the sum of the cost of the prover and the witnesses.
Table 1 summarizes the results for different numb r of witnessesM .
The pr ver perfor s 4 +M(Ñ + l g(U ·E)/ϕ +2) hash evaluations
andM +10 EC point multiplications (EPM), where Ñ = N for worst
case and Ñ = N /2 for average case. The main cost of the witness
consists of N + log(U ·E)/ϕ +8 hash evaluations and 12 EC point
multiplications.
Table 1: Runtimes of Location Proof Generation and Verifi-
cation, and the Size of Location Proof.
M
Computation time (s)
PfSize (KB)PfGen Ve ify
Prover Witness Total Verifier
5 0.116/0.133 0.089/0.098 0.205/0.231 0.00065 1.16
10 0.237/0.276 0.089/0.098 0.326/0.347 0.0011 2.17
15 0.331/0.382 0. 0.089/0.098 0.42/0.48 0.0018 3.19
Verification Time. During verification, the prover and the wit-
nesses open their secret seeds. This opening requires one PRF ev lu-
ation, which takes 10µs . Table 1 reports the cost of the verifier which
includes 5M hash evaluations and 2M EC point multiplications.
Proof Size. Table 1 shows the sizes of the location proofs (PfSize)
when the Merkle’s tree height is 30. Each time stamp costs 32 bits,
H2 costs 256 bits, and an EC point (P) 448 bit. Each ciphertext has the
size of 128 bits. Thu , the otal size is 32+2H2+P+(3H+2P+C)∗M =
(992+179 M) bits. Even withM = 15, each proof is only 3KB, which
is practical.
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6.3 Comparison
(G)TOTP Comparison.Here we generically compareGTOTP-MT
with a state-of-the-arts TOTP scheme [32] and a group signature
scheme [12] from the perspectives of security properties and perfor-
mance. In the comparison, we use the same setting and parameters
as in the above benchmarks. We let ‘PwSize’ denote the sie of pass-
word (which implies the communication cost), ‘Unforg’ denote the
unforeability, ‘BFc’ denote the cost of BF.Check, and ‘BFi’ denote
the cost of BF.Insert. Meanwhile, we compare the worst-case per-
formance between GTOTP and TOTP for simplicity. Moreover, we
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Trace Enti-Priv Loc-Priv PfGen Verify PfSize(KB)Prover Witness Prover Witness Prover Witness
[49] CLS
√ × × × × 7EPM + 1H1 3EPM + 1H1 6EPM + 2H1 0.36
[18] Ad Hoc
√ × × × × 27EPM + 3H1 4EPM + 2H1 28EPM + 6H1 1.4
[52] CLS × √ √ √ × 10EPM + 5H1 3EPM + 1H1 15EPM + 5H1 1.4
[38] Ad Hoc
√ × × × × 8EPM + 2H1 5EPM + 3H1 17EPM + 5H1 1.3
[31] DLB
√ × × × × 10EPM + 5H1 3EPM + 1H1 15EPM + 5H1 1.3
[50] DLB × √ × √ × 28EPM + 8H1 56EPM + 4Mul + 2H1 11Par + 5EPM + 5Mul + 1H1 0.56
[11] Ad Hoc
√ √ √ × √ 87ExN + 252EPM + 34Ex
+68Par + 12H1
597ExN + 42EPM + 2Ex
+8Par + 2H1
5ExN + 126EPM + 12Ex
+24Par + 6H1 7.94
Ours Ad Hoc
√ √ √ × √ 464H1 + 15EPM 98H1 + 12EPM 25H1 + 10EPM 1.16
let ‘Ex’ and ‘Par’ denote an exponentiation and a pairing operation
relative to bilinear groups, respectively.
The comparison results are shown in Table 2. The initialization
and password generation algorithms of GTOTP-MT scheme do not
introduce significant overheads comparing with the TOTP scheme
in [28]. The verification cost of GTOTP-MT mainly involves addi-
tional operations regarding verifying the Merkle proof and check-
ing the membership of the Bloom filter. The GVSTGen algorithm
of GTOTP-MT is done by a powerful RA, so it can run very fast.
Note that GTOTP-MT can provide more security properties than
the TOTP scheme without many additional computational over-
heads. And the password generation and verification algorithms of
GTOTP-MT are much more efficient than the GDS[12], since it does
not require any expensive pairing and exponentiation operations,
and N ≤ 60 is small in GTOTP-MT. For example, from the result
in [12], we can roughly estimate the costs of EPM and pairing as
300 and 2000 times the cost of H1, respectively.
PoL Comparison. In Table 3, we compare our proposed PoL
scheme with some existing related schemes in the perspectives
of witness setting, the security properties regarding entity privacy
(Enti-Priv) and location privacy (Loc-Priv), and the performance.
The number of witness is set toM = 5. Since the current communi-
cation techniques (such 5G and Bluetooth) are very fast, we do not
take the propagation delay of communication into account. Here
we consider the location privacy of all parties (including verifier).
Since most of prior works do not have any implementation, we
only count the major operations and proof size for performance
comparison. For simplicity and fairness, we instantiate the regular
digital signature and group digital signature used by prior works
with ECDSA [29] and the one [12], respectively. The public encryp-
tion scheme used by previous schemes are instantiated with the
ElGamal [14]. Furthermore, we let ‘ExN’ denote an exponentiation
in the Pailliar encryption scheme.
The witness setting may implicitly reflect the system model (incl.
functionalities). We let ‘CLS’ denote the centralized location server
(which might be used to either provide the positioning and location-
certifying service for the prover), and ‘Ad Hoc’ denote the setting
that the witnesses could be any entity (as long as they can be used
for testifying the location for the prover, e.g., a mobile device or
location beacon), and ‘DLB’ denote the distributed location beacon
(which achieves the similar functionality of CLS by distributed
beacons). Note that the witness setting and the security properties
of a PoL scheme imply the functionalities that can be achieved by
the corresponding PoL scheme.
From Table 3, we can see that only few schemes consider entity
privacy. Meanwhile, only [11] and our scheme provide traceabil-
ity while preserving the entity privacy and location privacy. The
PoL scheme by Zhu et al. [52] utilizes some kinds of mathemati-
cal combination operations to achieve entity and location privacy
(without achieving traceability), but the adversary may have non-
negligible advantages in breaking these two security properties.
Compared with [52], our scheme leverages provably secure cryp-
tographic building blocks. Moreover, our scheme adopts a more
flexible witness setting. Although our scheme only provides the
location privacy of prover to witnesses (but not to verifier), it might
be weaker than that of [50] (which uses zero-knowledge proof
scheme to achieve the location privacy to verifier). However, Wu
et al. [50] scheme needs distributed access points to be the location
beacons (whose locations are known to the verifier) to make the
zero-knowledge proofs verifiable to the verifier. Moreover, in many
applications, the location privacy of the prover to the verifier is
not mandatory. For example, in contact-tracing, the verifier needs
to know the location of the prover for disinfection. In contrast,
the entity and location privacy of both witnesses and prover to
each other is the main concern in our scheme. While comparing
with [11] (that provides similar security properties as our proposal),
it uses much more expensive building blocks than ours.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed Group time-based one-time passwords
scheme (GTOTP) that extends TOTP to the group setting. GTOTP
achieves membership authentication and privacy. We presented an
efficient GTOTP construction, which is based on an asymmetric
TOTP scheme and other standard cryptographic building blocks in-
cluding Merkle tree, pseudo-random function family, and collision-
resistant hash function. We showed how to apply GTOTP to con-
struct an efficient proof of location (PoL) scheme, which can be
used for contact tracing. We believe that the GTOTP is useful in
many other applications beyond PoL.
For future work, we plan to formulate our security models with
Universally Composable (UC) Security [4] which admits stronger
adversaries. We will also extend our GTOTP scheme to support
dynamic groups.
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A LISTS OF NOTIONS
Some important notations used in this paper are listed in Table 4.
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Table 4: Some Important Notations for GTOTP
U Number of group members
GP Identifies of group members GP = {ID1, . . . , IDU }
Ts , Te Start and end times of a protocol instance, respectively
∆e , ∆s life-spans of verify-point and password, respectively.
E , N Numbers of verify-points and passwords (that can be verified by
each verify-point), respectively.
vpID Verify-point of a party ID
vstID Verification state of a party, s.t., vstID = {vpiID } for i ∈ [∆t /∆e ].
vstG Group verification state vstG = {vstIDj } for j ∈ [U ].
sd iID The i-th secret seed for generating the i-the verify-point of ID.
skID Secret key for generating the secret seeds of ID.
pw i,zID The z-th password of ID in the i-th verify-epoch.
Ti , Tcurrent The i-th time slot and the current system time slot, respectively.
M Number of witness
Pj , Wj Identities of prover and witness, respectively
GP Identifies of group members GP = {P1, . . . , PU }
MCT, LCT Commitments of location and message, respectively
RLP Location proof pieces received by prover P
LPP Location proof generated by prover P
B DISCUSSION ON GTOTP PRIVACY
In this section, we discuss the achievable privacy for our GTOTP
schemes. We stress that each verify point of a party (i.e., the verify
point of a TOTP instance) in the GTOTP scheme can be seen a
pseudonym used for a verify-epoch. As other pseudonym schemes
(such as IFAL [45]), we assume that each verify point is used for a
short period of time, e.g., 5 mins (such a time period for a pseudo-
nym is recommended by European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) [22]). We do not consider the privacy leakage be-
cause of the user’s behaviour (or password usage pattern) within
the verify-epoch. Instead, we build GTOTP schemes to guarantee
that the verify points cannot be linked to leak a party’s real identity.
Since a Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) or Blue-
tooth enabled device would periodically execute service discovery
protocol by sending probe requests which includes the device’s
Media Access Control (MAC) address, so the attackers may ex-
ploit the MACs to trace the owner of the device. To prevent this
kind of threat, each mobile device can use a local a randomized
and continuously-refreshed MAC instead of its unique physical
global MAC, which is possible in the recent version of either IOS
or Android [27, 44].
C PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2
Let BKanonyi denote an event that there exists an adversary wins
in the i-th (modified) GTOTP_Anony game. We let AdvPRFA,F(κ,qf )
be the advantage of the adversary A in breaking the security of a
PRF function family F, where qf is number of queries that can be
asked to a chosen message oracle OPRF(·), and OPRF(m) takes as
input a messagem and outputs F(k,m) for a random key k $← KPRF.
Let AdvIND-CCAA,ASE (κ,qe ) denote the advantage of A in breaking the
security ofASE, whereqe is the number of encryption oracle queries
that A can ask. Also, we let AdvCRHFA,H (κ) denote the advantage of
A in breaking the collision-resistant property of H. We refer the
reader to [23, 28, 51] for the formal definitions of these advantages.
We omit them here to save space.
Game 0. This game equals the real security game. Thus, we have
that Pr[BKanony0 ] = Adv
GTOTP_Anony
A,GTOTP (κ,U ,Ts ,Te ,∆e ,∆s ).
Game 1.We change this game from the previous game by letting
the challenger abort if secret keys of two parties are identical (i.e.,
two F.Setup executions output the same key). If this abort event
occurs with non-negligible probability, then we could break the
security PRF. We assume that there is an algorithm F who tries
to break the security of F in the PRF game. In this case, the PRF
challengermay run F.Setup to get a challenge keyk∗. Meanwhile,F
may run the public algorithm F.Setup algorithms herselfU −1 times
to get keys k1, . . . ,kU−1. By our assumption, there are two keys
(k ′1,k ′2) in the set (k∗,k1, . . . ,kU−1) are identical. Since it holds with
a probability 2/U that either k ′1 or k ′2 equals to k∗, in which case,
the adversary knows the k∗ and then can break the security of PRF
with the knowledge of k∗. Since the adversary only has a negligible





2 · AdvPRFA,F(κ, 1).
Game 3. This game proceeds exactly like the previous game, but
the challenger aborts if she fails to guess which two TOTP instances
that the adversary chooses for the challenge. Hence, we have that
Pr[BKanony] = 2U · E · Pr[BK
anony
] . As a result, the challenge knows
the challenge TOTP instances in advance.
Game 4. In this game, we change the secret seed sdID∗i in the chal-
lenge verify-epoch to be a truly random value. If there exists an
adversary A that can distinguish this game from the previous
game, then it can be used to build an efficient algorithm B to break
the PRF security. B can run A as a subroutine and simulate the
game for her. As for the secret seed sdID∗i , B can obtain it from
the challenger which simulates the security game of PRF. Note
that in the PRF game the challenger will provide an PRF oracle
OPRF(m) to evaluate the function F(sdID∗i ,m) except for the chal-
lengemessage. SoB can get all other secret seeds of ID∗i by querying
OPRF(ID∗i | |j) for j ∈ [E]. Note that we compute identity-ciphertext
C∗ˆIDb
in the challenge password asC∗ˆIDb
= ASE.Enc(kRA,pw∗ˆIDb ,T
∗),
where ˆIDb ∈ {ID∗i , ID∗j }, pw∗ˆIDb := PwGen(sd ˆIDb ,T
∗), and T ∗ is
the start time of the challenge verify-epoch. Note that the change
is this game takes effective if and only if ID∗i is selected as chal-






Game 5. The challenger proceeds as before, but sets sdID∗j = sdID∗i .
That is, the challenger always returns a random secret seed regard-
less of the bit b. Obliviously, distinguishing this game from the
previous game implies an algorithm breaking the security of PRF,





modification in this game implies that the adversary cannot gain
any non-negligible advantage from the secret seeds.
Game 6.As the permutation is unpredictable, so adversaries cannot
infer the order of verify-points in input on given the output of π
with non-negligible advantage. After the adversary cannot infer
the leaf nodes’ owners (when they are not corrupted) from the
order of verify-points (which are, therefore, just random values to
the adversary. Moreover, each Merkle tree root is mapped tom bit
positions (which are set to be ‘1’) of the Bloom filter. And many
roots may share the same bit positions. So it is impossible for an
adversary to recover the relationship from two inserted roots from
the resultant Bloom filter. Now, if the adversary can distinguish the
510
Group Time-based One-time Passwords and its Application to Efficient Privacy-Preserving Proof of Location ACSAC ’21, December 6-10, 2021, Online
bit b, she can only try to break the security of the authenticate key
encryption scheme ASE. So we can build an algorithm C running
A as a subroutine. As for the challenge identity-ciphertext C∗ˆIDb
(in the challenge password), C can query the messages ( ˆID0, ˆID1)
to the ASE challenger which should encrypts one to generate the
challenge ciphertext. All other identity-ciphertexts can be obtained
by calling an encryption oracle simulated by the ASE challenger.
Note that C can simulate the rest of the values using the secret
keys of her own choice. B forwards the bit b∗ returned byA to the
ASE challenger. Thus, we have that Pr[BKanony] ≤ Pr[BK
anony
] +
AdvIND-CCAA,ASE (κ,E). The modification in this game implies that the
adversary cannot gain any non-negligible advantage from the secret
seeds. The advantages in the above games only give the adversary
a negligible overall advantage that proves Theorem 4.2.
D PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
Let BKtracei denote an event that there exists an adversary wins in
the i-th (modified) GTOTP_Trace game. We further use the nota-
tion AdvMT_ForgeA,MT (κ) to denote the advantage of an adversary A in
breaking the security of the Merkle tree scheme MT. And we let
AdvTOTP_ForgeA,TOTP (κ,Ts ,Te ,∆s ) be the advantage of an adversaryA in
breaking the unforeability of the TOTP scheme, and AdvARA,BF(T ,κ)
be the advantage of adversary finding a false positive error of
a Bloom filter instance within time T . The concrete definitions
of AdvMT_ForgeA,MT (κ), Adv
TOTP_Forge
A,TOTP (κ,Ts ,Te ,∆s ) and AdvARA,BF(T ,κ)
can be found in [3, 28, 36, 37].
Game 0. This game equals the real security game, and all queries
are answered honestly according to our protocol specification. Thus,
we have that Pr[BKtrace0 ] = Adv
GTOTP_Trace
A,GTOTP (κ,U ,Ts ,Te ,∆e ,∆s ).
Game 1. The challenger proceeds as before, but aborts if the secret
keys of two parties are identical. With the same argument in the
Game 1 of the proof of Theorem 4.2, we have that Pr[BKtrace] ≤
Pr[BKtrace0 ]+ U2 ·AdvPRFA,F(κ, 1). So the challenge parties should have
distinct secret keys.
Game 2. In this game, we add an abort rule that the challenger
aborts if the adversary outputs a password which results in a
verify-point vp∗ such that H1(vp∗ | |β) = H1(vpαIDj | |α) and IDj is
not corrupted, where vpαIDj is generated by the challenger, and β
and α are arbitrary indices. I.e., the adversary finds a hash colli-
sion to an honest verify-point. If such an abort event occurs non-
negligible, we could make use of the adversary to break the se-
curity of the collision-resistant hash function H1. Thus, we have
Pr[BKtrace] ≤ Pr[BKtrace0 ] + AdvCRHFA,H1 (κ).
Game 3. The challenger proceeds as before, but rejects any pass-
word resulting in a Merkle tree root which is not generated by
herself. This abort rule excludes the case that the adversary suc-
cessfully exploits the false positive error 2−ϵ of BF within the
lifespan (i.e., Te − Ts ) of a GTOTP-MT instance. Note that by
appropriately choosing the parameters of the Bloom filter we
can make the AdvCRHFA,BF (T ,κ) to be negligible. Thus, we have that
Pr[BKtrace] ≤ Pr[BKtrace0 ] + AdvARA,BF(T ,κ).
Game 4. In this game we want to reduce the security to that the
Merkle tree scheme. To realize this, We consider a Merkle-forge
event that an adversaryA outputs a password pw∗ which can pass
the verification process with a forged Merkle proof Pfv̂p∗ ∈ pw∗.
I.e., Pfv̂p∗ is not computed by the challenger during the execution
of GVSTGen, where v̂p∗ is the verify-point generated based on
pw∗. We change this game from the previous game by letting the
challenger abort when the Merkle-forge event occurs. If this abort
event occurs with non-negligible probability, then we can make
use ofA to break the security of the Merkle tree scheme. Thus, we
have that Pr[BKtrace] ≤ Pr[BKtrace0 ] + Adv
MT_Forge
A,MT (κ).
As the adversary cannot forge the Merkle proof in this game,
then she cannot bind a password with either an identity-ciphertext
which is not the owner of the password or an invalid identity-
ciphertext. In the sequel, we will show that the adversary cannot
forge the other values of a password.
Game 5. This game proceeds exactly like the previous game, but
the challenger aborts if she fails to guess which TOTP instance that
the adversary can break. Since there are U · E TOTP instances at
all, the probability of a correct guess is at least 1U ·E . Thus, we have
that Pr[BKtrace] = U · E · Pr[BKtrace0 ].We assume that the guessed
instance is the i∗-th TOTP instance of the party IDj without loss of
generality.
Game 6. In this game, we replace the secret seed sdi∗IDj = F(kIDj ,
IDj | |i∗) with a random value for the guessed i∗-th TOTP instance
of the party IDj . If there exists an adversaryA who can distinguish
this game from the previous game with non-negligible advantage,
then we can build an algorithm B which uses A to break the se-
curity of PRF. Specifically, B can submit a challenge query with
a message (IDj | |i∗) to the PRF challenger to get back the corre-
sponding challenge value rb which is a value of PRF(k∗, IDj | |i∗) or
a truly random value, where k∗ is a secret key chosen by the PRF
challenger. Then B and sets sdi∗IDj := rb .
The corresponding passwords of that instance are computed
based on sdi∗IDj . For other secret seeds of IDj , can query the
PRF oracle OPRF(IDj | |ι) for ι ∈ [E]\i∗. B can choose all other
secrets to simulate the game for A (including answering the
CompromiseSD(IDj ) queries of A). Note that if rb is the real
value, then the simulated game is identical to the previous game;
otherwise, it is identical to this game. Therefore, the capability
of A on distinguishing between the games implies the breach
of PRF. Due to the security of PRF, we have that Pr[BKtrace] ≤
Pr[BKtrace0 ] + AdvPRFA,F(κ,E).
Game 7. The challenger proceeds as before, but aborts if an adver-
sary A outputs a valid password ¯pw∗ of a TOTP instance at some
timeT ∗ such thatT ∗ is greater than all previously opened password
values. Obviously, such impersonation attempt ( ¯pw∗,T ∗) can be
used to break the guessed TOTP instance.We can build an algorithm
F (as in the previous game) by runningA as a sub-routine to break
the TOTP scheme. Note that F can resort to the TOTP challenger to
simulate the passwords of the guessed TOTP instance before time
T ∗. All other TOTP instances can be simulated based on the F ’s
own secrets. Since the TOTP scheme is secure by assumption, we
have that Pr[BKtrace] ≤ Pr[BKtrace0 ] + Adv
TOTP_Forge
A,TOTP (κ,Ts ,Te ,∆s ).
In this game, adversaries cannot use a password resulting in a
verify-point that is not generated by any honest party to win the
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G
Exp
A,PoL (κ ,U ,Ts ,Te , ∆e , ∆s ) :




$← {0, 1}, bl $← {0, 1}, create list HL← ∅ IF Exp = PoL_Anony and b∗ = ba and no Corrupt query to either ˆID0 or ˆID1
(vkG, {skIDi }i∈[U ], kRA) ← Reдistration(GP, Ts , Te , ∆e , ∆s ) and no OpenID query with input LPa∗P
IFExp = PoL_Anony, OUTPUT TrI , vkG OUTPUT 1
ELSE OUTPUT kRA, TrI , vkG IF Exp = PoL_Trace and LocProofVerify(LP∗P, L∗P ) → vr = 1
and (any identity cID∗i ← PoL.Open(LP∗kRA,P, i) < (⊥ and GP) or cID
∗
i = ⊥ )
Challenge( ˆID0, ˆID1, r ol e, { ¯IDj }j∈[M ], LP , L∗W1 , {LWj }j∈[M ]) : and no query to either LocProofGen or LocProofVerify after T
∗ where T ∗ ∈ L∗P
IF ( ˆID0, ˆID1, { ¯IDj }j∈[M ]), < GP or ˆID0 = ˆID1 , OUTPUT ⊥ and L∗P < HL and no Corrupt query to any contributor of LP∗P
IF LP is not close2 to either (L∗W1, LW1 ) or ρ locations in (L
∗
W1
, {LWj }j∈[M ]), OUTPUT ⊥ OUTPUT 1
P := ˆID0 and {Wj := ¯IDj }j∈[M ] IF Exp = PoL_LocPriv and b∗ = bl and no Corrupt query to any witnesses of LPa∗P
IF Exp = PoL_Anony and role = Prover and ba = 1, set P := ˆID1 and no LocProofVerify after T ∗ where T ∗ ∈ LPa∗P
IF Exp = PoL_Anony and role =W itness and ba = 1, setW1 := ˆID1 OUTPUT 1




Suspend game until the start of the next verify epoch
(Tra∗L , LPa∗P ) ← LocProofGen(LP, {LWj }j∈[M ], P, {Wj }j∈[M ]) LocProofGen(LP , {LWj }j∈[M ], P, {Wi }i∈[M ])
Suspend game until the start of the next verify epoch LPP ← Location-Proof -Gen(skP, {skWj }j∈[M ], vkG, LP, {LWj }j∈[M ])
OUTPUT Tra∗L and LP
a∗
P APPEND LPP → HL
OUTPUT TrL , LPP
Corrupt(IDj ) :
OUTPUT skIDj LocProofVerify(LPP , LP ) :
Extract the identities of contributors of LPP via Open algorithm
OpenID(LPP , i) : vr ← V er if ication(vkG, LPP, skP, {skWj }j∈[M ], LP )
OUTPUT Open(kRA, LPP, i) OUTPUT vr and TrV
Figure 9: Procedures Used to Define the Security for a PoL Scheme.
security game. So the advantage of this game is 0 as well, which
concludes this proof.
E SECURITY MODEL OF POL
Under semi-honest threat model, we aim to achieve the following
two security properties for PoL. The first is unforgeability and
traceability of location proofs. The second is anonymity for the
prover and witnesses. The third is location privacy of witnesses. To
formulate these security properties, we define three security games
PoL_Unforge, PoL_Anony , and PoL_LocPriv, respectively. We let
Exp ∈ {PoL_Unforge,PoL_Anony,PoL_LocPriv} be a variable to
indicate one of the games.
We present the relevant procedures of the security games in
Figure 9. The procedures are adapted from PPLP and GTOTP
models to fit in the PoL setting. The Initialize(GP) procedure is
defined to simulate the Registration protocol with the given pa-
rameters, which returns the protocol execution transcript TrI and
the group verification key vkG to the adversary. If the game is
not PoL_Anony, the secret key kRA is also returned. We use a
LocProofGen(LP , {LWj }j ∈[M ],P, {Wi }i ∈[M ]) procedure to simu-
late the protocol execution of Location-Proof-Gen protocol, with
which the adversary can specify the locations and participants for
running the protocol, and get the protocol execution transcript TrL
and the resultant location proof LPP , where (P, {Wi }i ∈[M ]) ∈ GP.
The procedure LocProofVerify(LPP , LP ) is defined to simulate the
Verification protocol, which enables the adversary to test the va-
lidity of a (forged) location proof and get the protocol execution
transcript TrV .
During the game, the adversary can ask once the Challenge
query to challenge either anonymity or location-privacy of the PoL
scheme. The challenger samples two random bits (ba ,bl )
$← {0, 1}
to test the capability of the adversary in the PoL_Anony game and
the PoL_LocPriv game, respectively. The adversary can specify the
initial identities of the prover P and theM witnesses {Wi } as well
as their initial locations. But in the PoL_Anony game, if ba = 1,
the challenger would replace the identity of either the prover or
the first witness with another identity ˆID1 depending on the role
role ∈ {Prover ,Witness} of the challenged party specified by the
adversary. Similarly, W1’s location is changed to be L∗W1 (provided
by the adversary either) in the PoL_LocPriv game ifbl := 1. The goal
of the adversary is to distinguish whether or not the corresponding
initial information of either P orW1 is modified by the challenger in
the run of the Location-Proof-Gen protocol. Meantime, we formulate
the fault tolerance via two parameters ρ (s.t. ρ ≤ M) andM : for a
correct location proof, we only need ρ location valid proofs from
the witness, thereby toleratingM − ρ failures or inaccuracies.
Definition E.1. We say that a PoL scheme PoL is secure if the ad-
vantages AdvPoL_AnonyA,PoL (pms) :=
Pr [GPoL_AnonyA,PoL (pms) = 1] − 1/2,
AdvPoL_TraceA,PoL (pms) := Pr
[




Pr [GPoL_LocPrivA,PoL (pms) = 1] − 1/2 of any
PPT adversary A in the corresponding games are negligible under
given parameters pms = (κ,U ,Ts ,Te ,∆e ,∆s ).
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